

Titel: BREV TIL: Eli Fischer-Jørgensen FRA: Charles Ernest Bazell (1955-02-11)

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after" then this meaning would formally include "ancestor of" (or for that matter "descendant of"). It is not necessary that a formal term should have any application whatsoever outside a given domain, "that is necessary is that it should be applicable, whenever the logical relations are the same. The relation "simultaneous with", if taken in the substantial sense, has no application in phonemics (as opposed to feature-analysis); but formally it has an application, for "simultaneous with obeys the same logical rules as "being in the same word with", and hence, if formally used, must include this. (If A is 'simultaneous with B, and B with C, A is simultaneous with C -- and this holds if one substitutes "is in the same word with" for "simultaneous", etc.). In other words a term is formally used if all substitutions are synonyms when they do not (in the context) affect the calculus of relations. And here, I think, one may lay down one reason why distribution is regarded as more "formal than composition. In a logical calculus, all the rules are either rules of distribution (known as "rules of formation" or else rules presupposing such rules (e.g. rules of transformation -- cf. Hillel's last article in Language). Composition does not enter into the picture - It has no need to, since the terms are defined exclusively in respect to their relations to other terms in the calculus; and a calculus tells one how terms behave, not "how they are made up" — it would be meaningless to ask how they are made up, since they have no make-up. (It is a notational fact, and not an arithmetical fact, that the sign "plus" is made up of two strokes; yet if one were (absurdly) to regard arithmetic as a "language", the composition of the sign would be just as interesting as its behaviour.) Yet since mathematics serves as a model of the "formal", is it not natural to take distribution as eminently formal". I believe that this that lies behind a lot of stuff in Harris and such people who have the algebraic model in front of them. It is a ridiculous model to take for a science like linguistics which begins with complexes and seeks to break them up. For the purpose of my paper, differences in substance were identified with differences in medium, but other differences could equally well be treated in the same way. For instance "paradigmatics and "syntagmatics may be treated as two substances having the same form, every relation in the one has a logically equivalent relation in the other. It is for this reason that a contrast is profitable, although there is no immediate logical opposition, I am here using "syntagmatic in its commonest sense (adopted in my booklet). On the other hand the genuine logical opposition between rules of substitution and rules of combination cannot be treated in this way, for they are not isomorphic. It is a tautology to say that a unit may be substituted for itself, but not a tautology to say that it can combine with itself (as in congruence). Whereas in syntagmatics (the relations of units in combination -- not the rules for their combination) there is the corresponding tautology; namely that the unit occupies the same segment as itself.

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